Abstract: Motivated by recent initial steps of the European Commission fostering cross-border bank mergers within Europe and with regard to possible conflicting objectives of competition policy and banking regulation concerning the bank merger review process, this paper studies the impact of national banking market concentration on financial stability while controlling for macroeconomic, bank-specific, supervisory and institutional factors.
Introduction
Resulting from proceeding globalization of financial and real markets, financial deregulation and advances in communication and information technology, 1 the banking industry has been subject to a number of significant changes over the past decades. As a consequence these changes have fostered competition and reduced margins in traditional banking services, which -in line with an increased shareholder pressure for financial performance-forced banks to merger and acquire financial institutes both domestic and cross country, within industry and across business lines.
The patterns, causes and effects of mergers and acquisitions in banking have been documented by recent studies in great detail (ECB, 2000; OECD, 2000; BIS, 2001 ; GROUP OF TEN, 2001; IMF, 2001) . With regard to these studies the most important incentives for bank mergers and acquisitions have been: (1) Cost synergies mainly arising from economies of scale, risk diversification and X-efficiency, (2) revenue enhancements mainly emerging from economies of scope and rising monopolistic rents, (3) economic conditions (e.g. corresponding internationally acting bank clients, using complementary distribution networks, lowering funding costs, gaining market power) and (4) other motives (e.g. mergers after financial crises, building a defense against takeovers).
Although in general the same causes of banking consolidation in industrialized countries apply to emerging countries as well, consolidation differs in relation to the following specific aspects (see IMF, 2001: 120) . Firstly, while cross border bank mergers and acquisitions rarely occur in industrialized countries, they represent a large share in emerging markets. Secondly, banking consolidation in industrialized economies has primarily been a way to gain greater market share in order to preserve or improve efficiency and franchise value as well as competitiveness in a global financial market. In contrast, it has been an instrument to resolve financial crises in emerging countries in the first place and only in the following a key to stay competitive within a globalizing financial market. Thirdly, while the role of market forces within the consolidation process was more dominant in industrialized banking industries, governmental authorities were the driving forces for consolidation in emerging countries.
Focusing closer on Europe a likewise high level of bank merger activity has been determined between 1990 and 2000 with a remarkable acceleration in consolidation activities in recent 1
Especially for Europe the introduction of the Euro has accelerated financial market integration which also encourages cross-border activity in banking.
years (see GROUP OF TEN, 2001: 2f) . Most of the mergers involved banks competing in the same business line and country whilst cross-border mergers within (or outside) Europe were less frequent, especially those involving banks in different business lines or mergers between banks and firms of different industrial sectors. However, within the last three years cross-border bank mergers within Europe have been increasing whilst domestic mergers have been decreasing which might be the beginning of a "new merger trend".
This trend might result from two aspects. On the one hand, domestic bank mergers may be limited in some European markets due to a high level of market concentration leaving only a few sizeable targets for bidding banks. This especially refers to western European countries like Belgium, Finland or the Netherlands which in each case exhibit an approximate degree of 84% of market concentration measured in terms of the fraction of assets held by the five largest banks in relation to total banking system's assets (see ECB, 2007) On the other hand, emerging Europe 2 still offers the opportunity to expose higher growth markets than many other domestic countries in western Europe. Due to privatization programs implemented by a number of governments of emerging Europe in the late 1990s, western European banks were encouraged to enter these markets by merger or acquisition of formerly government-owned banks. A key feature of this cross-border banking activity has been the regional expansion of retail banking with, for example, western European countries like Austria, Germany and Italy expanding into neighboring markets of the Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland or Hungary (see PWC, 2006: 11) .
As a consequence, foreign ownership of bank assets within markets in the 10 new EU member states is high with approximately 66% (see ECB, 2007) .
Promoting Cross-border Bank Mergers in Europe
With regard to a comparatively low level of cross-border mergers and acquisitions between
European banks within Europe, in September 2004 the European Finance Ministers mandated the Commission of the European Communities to evaluate conclusive explanations on this issue. Next to unfavorable expectations on cost synergies and revenue enhancements 3 European banks pointed out aspects of banking regulation and supervision as possible obstacles for crossborder mergers within Europe (see COMMISSION, 2005: 18f) . 4 With regard to the latter, banks 2 That is the 10 new European member states with Czech-Republic, Cypress, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 3 This is confirmed by a large part of early empirical literature. Those studies in sum provide that mergers between large bank holdings both in the U.S. and in Europe have not improved cost efficiency significantly (see e.g. SHAFFER, 1993; PERISTIANI, 1997 and ALTUNBAS, MOLYNEUX and THORNTON, 1997) . 4 Furthermore, important factors discouraging cross-border consolidation are corporate and national cultural differences.
-4-particularly complained about current supervisory arrangements for cross-border activities as for example the misuse of supervisory power during a sparsely transparent and tedious bank merger review process. Moreover, on-going costs after the merger resulting from a lack of consolidated supervision for banks operating cross-border and from deviations in national supervisory practices were emphasized.
Considering these disputed points the Commission has taken initial steps to propose legislative changes and has revised the relevant article 16 of the European Banking Directive (see COMMISSION, 2006) . As stated in the Commission's White Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) the objective is to optimize bank merger review processes by accelerating the process itself 5 and setting evaluation criteria 6 to ensure cross-country consistency, reduce regulatory discretion and promote a higher level of transparency. 7 However, in our opinion the Commission's proposals on a new Directive for European cross-border bank mergers suffers from inadequacy in two aspects since (1) possible effects of on-going consolidation (market concentration) on systemic stability in Europe as well as (2) the interaction-process between antitrust and supervisory authorities during the merger approval process was given little attention.
Ad (1).
Reviewing bank mergers with regard to financial stability becomes essential if the systemic risk exposure of the banking market increases with the bank size. On-going banking consolidation may raise the question of whether large banking institutions are now "too big to be allowed to fail" for European countries and whether the systemic linkages of bank failures have changed due to the consolidation process, both domestically and cross-border. 8 Since systemic stability primarily remains a national concern, two aspects on the impact of consolidation on systemic stability in Europe have to be considered. On the one hand, the so-called "home country principle" provokes that supervisory responsibility still remains with the competent authorities of the home country whereas the host country's supervisory authorities will have limited 5
Supervisory authorities are constrained to finish the supervisory approval process within 30 days from the day the merger is indicated. Evaluation criteria proposed by the Commission are almost the same as for licensing a new bank. Hence the supervisory authority has to examine (1) the reputation of the bidding bank, (2) the reputation and experience of every person which is managing the bidding bank, (3) the financial soundness of the bidding bank, (4) the permanent compliance with the European Banking Directive and (5) the risk of money laundering and financing terrorism (see COMMISSION, 2006: 3) .
7
As a first result, a number of European banks have indicated their willingness to further engage in cross-border activity as soon as steps against the impediments to cross-border mergers and acquisitions are undertaken by the European Commission. However, one has to keep in mind that the absence of legal barriers in Europe has been allowed for crossEuropean banking for a long time. Hence, the question here is whether the recent consolidation activity in Europe provides effects on systemic stability.
powers in the event of a systemic situation caused by a foreign bank. On the other hand, responsibility for supervision and prudent regulation is still vague for pan-European banks that emerge from intensifying cross-border bank mergers.
Remarkably, the Commission's proposals on a new European Directive for reviewing crossborder bank mergers do not pay much attention to the relationship between on-going banking consolidation and its probable effects on systemic stability (see COMMISSION, 2006) . While only one single evaluation criterion refers to the financial soundness of the bidding bank prior to the merger, the Commission has failed to set up an evaluation criterion to prove for a possible impact of the merged bank's size on its internal overall risk and on systemic stability of national banking markets and the whole European market respectively. As we will discuss later on in detail (see sec. 3), both theoretical and empirical literature is ambiguous on the relationship between banking concentration and systemic stability. It might be this dichotomy that has deterred the Commission from establishing a particular evaluation criterion covering this issue.
However, the absence of a systemic stability-criterion might hold an incentive for supervisory discretion once more. This aspect becomes more important since CARLETTI and HARTMANN (2002) have shown that competent authorities in Europe have different preferences when considering aspects of systemic stability going along with the merger approval process. In particular, authorities could pretend to withhold approval for reasons of systemic stability but actually aim at promoting national financial markets to ensure the creation of "national bank champions".
Ad (2).
Direct responsibility for approving a bank merger is usually held by the competent authorities of each European member state. 9 The approval depends on two separate review processes. While the national antitrust authority has to review the merger under efficiency aspects initiating an antitrust suit, competent national supervisory authorities (central bank, finance ministry or supervisory body) have to examine the merger under regulatory aspects according to the European "Second Banking Directive" (see EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 1989, Article 5) . Although the European Commission has revised legislation concerning the merger review process by proposing legislative changes of the Banking Directive, it is still indeterminate how interaction between national antitrust authorities and supervisory bodies will be organized in detail. In particular, it is still not obvious in which way decision-power is being split between both authorities and how efficiency or stability aspects will be weighted within the merger approval 9
Only in case of exceeding given thresholds, bank mergers will be examined by the Merger Task Force of the European Commission applying the "EC Merger Regulation" (see EC Council Regulation No. 139/2004, 10 
Related Theoretical and Empirical Literature
The idea of a relationship between concentration in banking and systemic stability is still sparsely debated in appropriate economic literature. 10 Moreover, both appropriate economic theory and empirical evidence provide conflicting predictions about the link between banking concentration and financial stability (see e.g. ALLEN and GALE, 2004) .
"Concentration-Stability" View
Highly concentrated and less competitive banking markets are often associated with a lower probability of banking failures. KEELEY (1990) as well as HELLMANN, MURDOCK and STIGLITZ (2000) argue that a bank's "charter or franchise value", which is defined as the benefit that accrues to bank equity holders and managers from future operations, has an important influence on the bank's financial soundness. They suggest that higher franchise values provide higher opportunity costs when going bankrupt which again will deter risk-taking behavior of the bank's management since equity holders will not encourage excessive risk-taking that might jeopardize their franchise ("charter value hypothesis"). In contrast, enhancing market competition (e.g. as a result of financial deregulation) typically leads to a reduction in monopoly rents and franchise value. Similar to the agency problem pointed out by JENSEN and MECKLING (1976) , under the cover of deposit insurance funds and/or public guarantees bank managers may be more vulnerable to take excessive risks in order to compensate the loss of monopoly rents by means of possible higher investment profits (see also EDWARDS and MISHKIN, 1995; MATUTES and VIVES, 2000; CORDELLA and YEYATI, 2002) . This vulnerability for a so called "gambling -7-for resurrection" (see KANE, 1989; DEWATRIPONT and TIROLE, 1999) may provoke an increase in bank failures if too many risky investments fail and capital reserves cannot absorb losses.
Given a low level of contestability it is assumed that a monopolistic bank will tend to carry out "credit rationing" since fewer but more qualitative credit investments will increase the return of the singular investment. In this context PETERSEN and RAJAN (1995) show that a monopolistic bank is provided with the incentive to incur the costs associated with a reduction of informa- of contagion with a perfectly competitive banking sector. They show that an external macroeconomic shock could spread through the interbank market and cause all banks in the financial system go bankrupt. However, modifying the model and allowing for imperfect competition in the banking market they find that the financial sector is less susceptible to contagion than it is under perfect competition.
In the presence of economies of scale and scope in financial intermediation (see e.g. DIAMOND, 1984; RAMAKRISHNAN and THAKOR, 1984; BOYD and PRESCOTT; 1986 ) large banks may diversify loan portfolio risks more efficiently than smaller banks. Thus, banking systems consisting of a few large banks (highly concentrated markets) should be less susceptible to fragility than industries with many small banks (highly competitive markets). The idea is that apart from a functional diversification of risks large and cross-border performing banks may additionally obtain economies of scope and scale by geographical risk diversification. Since MÉON and WEILL (2001) have shown that economic cycles of many European countries are not perfectly correlated, geographical diversification might play an important role in reducing banks' overall -8-risk. BESANKO and THAKOR (1993) as well as BOOT and THAKOR (2000) emphasize the effect of relationship banking on financial stability in consolidated banking markets. They show that informational rents being acquired during relationship lending decline and relationship banking itself decreases in value when the banking industry becomes more competitive. As a consequence, banks tend to choose risky investment portfolio strategies to compensate for the loss of risk-diversifying rents. Moreover, increased competition impairs relationship lending by promoting adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Regarding a higher assortment of potential financiers more low-quality borrowers may enter the credit market and make the adverse selection problem more virulent. Regarding the opportunity of borrowers to switch to rival capital providers at a later stage, even the moral hazard problem may become more severe.
Finally, it is suggested, that a few larger banks may be easier to monitor by supervision authorities than many small banks. Hence, supervision of banks may be more effective and the risk of a system-wide contagion may probably decline. ALLEN and GALE (2000) confirm this idea by comparing the U.S. banking sector with the UK and Canadian banking market. They find a history of much higher financial instability for the U.S. banking market comprising of a large number of banks than for the UK and Canadian banking sector with each consisting only of a few larger banks. BOYD and DE NICOLÓ (2006) show that higher loan interest rates, typically granted by monopolistic banks, may induce corporate clients to take on risky investments to compensate higher loan interest rates and loan repayment. As a consequence the likelihood of loan defaults increases and entails higher bank fragility. Similarly, BOYD, DE NICOLÓ and SMITH (2004) show that monopolistic banks have an incentive to reduce liability reserves due to economies of scale and scope from payment-transactions and thus are more prone to suffer external liquidity shocks.
"Concentration-Fragility" View
Taking into account the threat of systemic contagion, politicians and supervisory authorities are usually more concerned about single bank failures in sufficiently concentrated banking markets.
Thus, larger banks are often more likely to receive public guarantees or subsidies rather than smaller banks, which is discussed as the "too big to be allowed to fail"-doctrine by economic literature (see e.g. BOYD and RUNKLE 1993; MISHKIN, 1999) . Subsequently, the moral hazard -9-problem becomes more severe provoking vulnerability for larger banks to take on excessive risks in the presence of a government's safety net (see MISHKIN, 1999) .
CETORELLI ET AL., 2007 emphasize that a higher degree of functional as well as geographical diversification should lower a bank's overall risk. However, these effects could result in reduced managerial efficiency, less effective internal corporate control, increased operational risk and an extensive oversight that may be prone to supervisory failures.
Finally, the idea that a few larger banks would be easier to monitor and control by supervisory authorities may be true regarding the total number of banks in a market. However, one has to keep in mind that a bank's size may be positively correlated with complexity. Thus, an increasing firm size may be associated with lower transparency since the size allows banks to expand across multiple geographic markets and business lines, using sophisticated financial instruments and building up complex corporate organizations. In relation to this, the monitoring of a single large bank (and in particular a financial conglomerate) will be more extensive and may lead to regulatory and supervisory failures that may endanger systemic stability.
Empirical Evidence
In line with appropriate theoretical literature even empirical work is ambiguous on the relationship between concentration and stability in banking. In addition, cross-country evidence is still short. Following CARLETTI and HARTMANN (2002) it may be distinguished between four types of empirical studies:
Studies that examine the relationship between market power and banks' overall risk exposure (e.g. KEELEY, 1990) ,
Studies that explore risk-diversification effects regarding changes in the bank's size, in particular due to a merger (e.g. BOYD and RUNKLE, 1993; BENSTON, HUNTER and WALL, 1995; DEMSETZ and STRAHAN, 1997; BOYD and GRAHAM, 1991,1998; CYBO-OTTONE AND MURGIA, 2000; STIROH, 2006) Studies that measure changes in bank stock return correlations as an indicator of systemic instability in the presence of banking consolidation (e.g. PILLOFF and SANTONOMERO, 1998; BECHER, 2000; DELONG, 2001; DE NICOLÓ and KWAST, 2002) ,
Studies that discuss efficiency and risk in different banking market structures on a crosscountry-level (see below).
stability for different European countries we focus on studies that examine banking system stability in different banking market structures on a cross-country level.
To begin with, in an early cross-country study BORDO, REDISH and ROCKOFF (1995) assess the performance of the U.S. and Canadian banking system for the period 1920 -1980 finding fewer failure rates for Canadian banks and a higher degree of systemic stability in Canada compared to the U.S. banking system. As the empirical analysis a higher efficiency of Canadian banks, they conclude that stability-results could be traced back to the oligopolistic market structure of the Canadian banking sector.
HOGGARTH, MILNE and WOOD (1998) (2004) provide statistical evidence of a positive effect of bank market concentration on the fragility of the five largest banks in a country as measured by the Z-score. They find that highly concentrated banking systems exhibit a higher systemic risk exposure than less concentrated systems.
Since equity capital decreases with an increase in market concentration they conclude that consolidation may raise the bank's leverage and provoke an incentive for managers of larger banks to take on correlated risks which dominate diversification effects.
Similarly, SCHAECK, CIHÁK AND WOLFE (2006) an increase in banking concentration does not result in higher banking system fragility. This result is robust when controlling for differences in bank regulatory policies and national institutions affecting market competition.
Empirical Analysis

Data
Comprehensive descriptions of variables and data sources as well as descriptive statistics for the entire set of variables are provided in Table 1 and 3 of the statistical appendix. Moreover, According to the ECB MFIs comprise resident credit institutions as defined in the European Community Law and other resident financial institutions whose business it is to receive deposits and/or close substitutes for deposits from entities other than MFIs and, for their own account, to grant credits and/or make investments in securities.
-12-fact that it is difficult to define an exact beginning and end of a crisis as well as its exact economic and social costs. Moreover, suffering from a banking crisis may be an implication for regulatory failures. Hence, competent supervisory authorities will be less interested in completely announcing banking crises that have occurred within national borders. Finally, under the framework of a "to big to be allowed to fail"-doctrine weak and unstable banks are often liquidated secretly by supervisory authorities within financial restructuring programs or promoted by the banking sector itself with the help of deposit insurance funds in order to avoid systemic contagion.
Taking this into account, we measure banks' financial soundness by analyzing the banks' asset quality. A popular measure concerning a bank's distance to insolvency is the so-called Z-score (see BOYD and RUNKLE, 1993; CRAIG and SANTOS, 1997; DE NICOLÓ ET AL., 2004; BECK and LAEVEN, 2006; LAEVEN and LEVINE, 2006) 13 which is summarized as follows:
We define µ as the return on average assets before taxes (ROAA), k as the equity capital in percent of total assets and σ as the standard deviation of the ROAA. Hence, the Z-score combines in one single indicator the bank's profitability (µ), the bank's capital-environment (k) and its return volatility (σ). Obviously, the Z-score increases with the banks profitability and equity capital and decreases with its return volatility. From a statistical point of view the Z-score indicates the critical threshold of standard deviations that a ROAA realization has to drop below its expected value before equity is exhausted and the bank becomes insolvent. From an economic viewpoint the Z-score initially measures the probability of a bank going insolvent when the value of assets becomes lower than the value of debt. Hence, a higher (lower) Z-score implies a lower (higher) probability of insolvency risk. concentration measurement will arise when aggregating balance sheet data for these bank groups. Doing so, market concentration would significantly increase (e.g. for Germany to approx. 67%) and distort real concentration and competition measures for these markets. Furthermore, some European countries (especially the UK) exhibit lower banking market concentration ratios as they provide international financial centers with a high presence of foreign banks among only a few domestic banks. In addition, some of the eastern European member states (e.g. Estonia) provide high concentration ratios since they are comparatively smaller than most of the western European countries. The same aspect applies to western European outskirt countries (e.g. Finland, Belgium). Finally, in most of the eastern European countries formerly large state banks were privatized after financial deregulation which at first resulted in highly concentrated banking markets. However, with only a few exceptions concentration ratios decreased over time due to increasing foreign bank entry.
Taking these aspects into account it seems to be less surprising that banking market concentration still differs significantly across European countries, ranging from very unconcentrated banking markets such as Germany with a ratio of 17% to higher concentrated ones in half of the European countries and especially in emerging and outskirt Europe with the highest concentration ratio at 99.2% in Estonia (see Table 3 ) Typically, the fraction of assets or deposits held by the three or five largest banks is constructed as one possible measure of concentration in banking markets (see e.g. BARTH, CAPRIO and LEVINE, 2001) . While an increase of this concentration ratio reflects an increase of consolidation, a decrease of the ratio either indicates an entry of new banks into the market or that consolidation is concentrated among smaller firms, or possibly both. Though a variety of feasible concentration measures is suggested by industrial organization literature (see for a survey BIKKER and HAAF, 2001), to our knowledge only an n-firm concentration ratio (CR n ) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) have been used in empirical studies so far. To ensure comparability to former cross-country studies we calculate concentration ratios using the fraction of assets held by the five largest banks to total banking system's assets as well (ebkconc5). Nevertheless we did robustness checks for the three largest banks and the respective HHIs for three and five largest banks but did not achieve distinct changes in our results.
We retrieved concentration ratios (CR 5 ) for banking markets of the EU-25 from the ECB and While the structure of banking markets should reflect the degree of realized economies of scale and scope by banks, market size describes the potential for these economies that might be realized by means of a merger. Hence, we additionally consider the development of the financial sector and other forms of financial intermediation in each country by including total bank assets as a percentage of GDP as an indicator of the banking market's size (tassgdp).
We control for four overall variables (macroeconomic conditions, bank-specific characteristics, banking supervisory and institutional environment) that may either influence a bank's financial soundness or the market structure, or both. Table 2 indicates included control variables and outlines the expected effect on dependent variables in association with the respective regression specification. Macroeconomic data is retrieved from IMF's World Economic Outlook Database and International Financial Statistics. Since we consider mature as well as emerging European countries, we include GDP per capita (gdpcap) as a country-development indicator and as a proxy for the quality of the institutional and regulatory environment in each country. The rate of growth of real GDP (gdpgr) is considered since investment opportunities for banks should be correlated with business cycles. We expect that the banks' investments opportunities and hence profitability and stability rises in economic booms.
We include a country's annual unemployment rate in percent of total work force (unempr) and assume that higher unemployment quota will affect the borrowers' ability to repay loans which again should affect banks' asset quality negatively. Similarly, an increase in real short term interest rates (irstc) is likely to influence the bank's financial soundness; however, the effect is two-sided. While a passing through of increasing short term interest rates to deposit rates will raise the banks' funding costs, a handing down to lending rates should raise profitability but might let loan repayment be more difficult for borrowers which could result in higher loan default rates. Thus, the influence of changes in real short interest rates on profitability depends on the dominating effect. To shed a brighter light on the actual effect, we additionally include changes in the interest rate spread (irspr) as well as the annual change of a bank's lending rates (lrc). The effect of inflation rate changes (inflr) depends on whether inflation is anticipated by -15-banks or not, or whether it coincides with general economic instability. Interest rates tend to rise in the presence of inflation. Hence, inflation is probably associated with higher realized net interest margins and profitability. However, since costs may also increase under inflation, the effect on profitability and bank capital ratios depends on the net effect from increasing net interest margins and costs.
Next to macroeconomic indicators we control for bank-specific characteristics that may influence stability in banking. We retrieved commercial banks' balance sheet data from the BankScope database. Ratios of loan loss provisions to net interest margins (llprovnir) and non performing loans to total assets (npltass) are used to control for the banks' asset quality. Moreover, equity to gross loans (eqgl) is included to explore the banks' capital environment serving as a buffer against sudden macroeconomic or liquidity shocks. Finally, net loans to total assets (nltass) and liquid liabilities to GDP (lilgdp) are included to control for the banks' liquidity.
All countries in our sample follow the Basle Capital Accord and the European Capital Requirement Directive respectively. For this reason we control for banking regulation and supervision by examining the extent (the quality) to which regulatory rules from Basle and Brussels are implemented by each country. However, we find that explanatory variables describing the quality of banking regulation and supervision (i.e. index of compliance with Basel Core Principles) present an endogeneity problem since financial stability should be influenced by banking regulation and supervision.
14 We correct for this phenomenon by including instrumental variables instead which have to correlate strongly with the explanatory variable but not with the error term. We find three popular governance indicators provided by KAUFMANN, KRAAY and MASTRUZZI (2007) to be highly correlated with the banking regulation and supervisionvariable: of governance effectiveness (gove), regulatory quality (regq) and rule of law (rol). As these instrumental variables should have a positive effect on regulatory and supervisory quality but not necessarily a direct effect on our dependent variables within the respective regression, we have to control for this effect. Including an interaction term is the appropriate way to test for this economic phenomenon. Hence, we build two interaction terms supv = gove*regq and supv2 = regq*rol.
14 The endogeneity problem is not only observed for our main regression (1) but also for regressions (3) and (4) since the bank's capital environment and asset quality should as well be influenced by the quality of banking regulation and supervision. 
Econometric Strategy
The panel structure of our data allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity. We deduce an adequate specification for our regression equation as follows: With regard to our research question and with reference to the dataset used for our regressions this is considered to be a consequent strategy since most variations should be observed over time. Concerning banking regulation financial markets in Europe are very homogenous following the Basle Capital Accord and the European Capital Requirement Directive respectively. As a consequence, variation in the cross-section between explanatory variables is low and hence the application of random effects techniques is appropriate. Moreover, the random effects allows for including time-invariant variables among regressors.
Empirical Results
We present major results of our regressions in Table 4 
Concentration and Z-score
Banking market concentration (ebkconc5) enters regression (1) negatively and significantly at the five-percent level. Hence, we find statistically significant evidence that higher market concentration has a negative impact on financial stability as measured by the Z-score-technique.
This result corresponds to the "concentration-fragility" view in theoretical literature and gener- We include the unemployment rate (unempr) and the annual change in inflation rate (inflr) to control for the influence of macroeconomic conditions on financial stability. While the unemployment rate indicates the borrowers' solvency which again should influence their ability to repay loans completely and at due date, a rising inflation rate might coincide with general economic instability. As expected, unemployment rate enters the regression significantly negative at the one-percent level indicating that a decrease in loan-quality reduces banks' financial -18-soundness. The effect of inflation rate changes is not distinct from a theoretical point of view since it depends on whether inflation is anticipated by banks or not. However, entering the regression significantly negative at the five-percent level we assume that banks may not have anticipated changes in inflation rates fully and/or correctly. Since inflation is comparably stable for western European countries, we assume that western banks operating in higher inflated eastern European countries might underestimate inflation and may therefore fail to anticipate inflation rate changes adequately.
We additionally include the annual change of short term interest rates (irstc) as a macroeconomic measure. Economic theory suggests that the effect of interest rate changes on financial stability depends on whether and how banks will hand down changes to customers. Hence, if a handing down to deposits rates outbalances the passing through to lending rates, banks' profits should decrease since the bank's funding costs will rise. As higher annual changes of short term interest rates have a statistically significant negative effect on financial stability at the fivepercent level, our regression suggests that rising interest rates have dominantly been passed through to deposit rates indicating a higher level of competition in the market for bank deposits.
With regard to different bank-specific characteristics in Europe we further control for the ratio of banks' equity to gross loans (eqgl). From a theoretical viewpoint equity capital serves as a "buffer" protecting from external macroeconomic or liquidity shocks. As expected, equity to gross loans has a strong statistical effect on stability entering the regression positively at the one-percent level.
Furthermore, we explore each country's banking regulatory and supervisory environment by including the interaction term supv = gove*regq comprising of governance effectiveness (gove) and regulatory quality (regq) as two instrumental variables (see 5.1). Corresponding to appropriate banking regulation arguments the interaction term enters the regression significantly positive but weak at the ten-percent level. However, regressing non-performing loans to total assets on the supervision-variable, the interaction term provides statistical evidence of a positive impact of banking regulation and supervision on the bank's asset quality at the one-percent level (see 5.3.4).
Finally, we control for the institutional environment including the overall score of the Economic Freedom index (ecfree). Since this composite index measures financial freedom among others, an increase in the index indicates higher banking freedom that results in fewer regula--19-tory restrictions on banking activities. As mentioned above, economic theory is ambiguous about the effects of higher banking freedom on the bank's financial soundness. We find that economic freedom has a negative impact on the Z-score, however statistical evidence is weak at the ten-percent level only. Despite this, we suggest that taking on higher or less familiar risks from non-traditional banking business due to a higher level of banking freedom outweighs potential diversification effects. Our suggestion is supported by specification (2) 
Concentration and ROAA
By means of regressions (2) - (4) we examine the effects of banking market concentration on financial stability more precisely regressing individual components of the Z-score on concentration ratios. We begin with specification (2) analyzing the effects of market concentration on the banks' ROAA. Thus, we simultaneously add an IO-perspective to our analysis which is necessary to evaluate a possible stability-efficiency trade-off emerging from higher market concentration as discussed within the framework of the research question.
In order to exemplify the effect of remarkably high market concentration on banks' profitability we generate two new indicators (conch) and (bkpoph) for highly concentrated banking industries. These concentration variables are computed covering concentration ratios larger than 70%
and population-bank ratios larger than 0.2 as calculated breaking points. As traditional IOtheory suggests, banks' ROAA increases for banks gaining market power in concentrated banking markets. Since both indicator variables enter the regression significantly positive at the onepercent level, our empirical results correspond to these theoretical findings.
The negative effect of rising inflation (inflr) on banks' profitability is statistically significant at the one-percent level confirming our findings from regression (1) that banks do not anticipate inflation rate changes fully and/or correctly. Moreover, it might be concluded that rising inflation influences the bank's operational costs more extensively than its net interest margins.
As expected, a higher unemployment rate (unempr) has a negative impact and higher interest rate spreads (irspr) have a strong positive statistical effect on banks' profitability at the onepercent level. A higher ratio of non-performing loans to total assets (npltass) as well as increasing loan loss provisions to net interest margins (llprovnir) -both indicating poorer quality of the bank's assets and a higher exposure to risk-enter the regression significantly negative.
As discussed above, economic freedom (ecfree) has a strong negative effect on banks' profitability at the one-percent level. This confirms our findings from regression (1) indicating that the diversification effects potential resulting from lower restrictions in banking is outweighed by taking on higher or less familiar risks from non-traditional banking.
Concentration and Equity Capital
Leaving the IO-perspective we once more consider the influence of banking market concentration on financial stability within the regressions (3) and (4). First of all we focus on the equity to total assets ratio as another element of the Z-score's numerator.
According to the theoretical idea that larger banks may use higher profits to build up a "capital buffer" that protects from external macroeconomic and liquidity shocks, concentration (ebkconc5) enters regression (3) significantly positive, however, at the ten-percent level only.
As expected, we find statistically significant evidence of a positive effect of macroeconomic indicators (gdpcap and gdpgr) on banks' capital environment. Since banks are usually more profitable under prospering economic conditions, we conclude that they will widen their capital in economic booms and hence engage in precautionary measures in anticipation of forthcoming economic downturns.
From a theoretical point of view the effect of rising real short term interest rates (irstc) on banks' capital is ambiguous. As discussed above, the impact depends on the outweighing effect of handing down interest rate changes to lending or deposit rates. We find that higher real short term interest rates have a significantly negative effect on banks' equity capital. This result confirms our observation from regression (1) indicating that handing down higher interest rates to lending rates is outweighed by a stronger passing through to deposit rates.
Again, we explore each country's banking regulatory and supervisory environment by including the interaction term supv2 = regq*rol comprising instrumental variables of regulatory quality (regq) and the rule of law (rol) as a proxy for contract enforcement. The interaction term enters the regression significantly negative. Hence, we suggest that a high quality of regulatory envi--21-ronment in association with an efficient rule of law supports the enforceability of outstanding debts. Thus, reliable enforcement rules enable banks to reduce equity capital (not explicitly regulatory capital) that is hold as a "buffer" against losses from bad debt or non-performing loans.
Corresponding to our results from regressions (1) and (2), a higher level of economic freedom (ecfree) has a statistically significant negative impact on banks' capital environment. Hence, a higher risk exposure due to higher banking freedoms will decrease the bank's profitability when losses from risks become real and will therefore shorten the banks capital environment.
Concentration and Non-performing Loans
In contrast to the idea that larger banks may raise asset quality by "credit rationing" as provided by advocates of the "concentration stability" view (see PETERSEN and RAJAN; CAMINAL and MATUTES, 2002) , regression (4) indicates a statistically significant positive effect of higher market concentration (ebkconc5) on the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets at the fivepercent level and a statistically positive impact of the bank's size on the non-performing-loans ratio at the ten-percent level respectively.
As expected, macroeconomic indicators (gdpcap and gdpgr) enter the regression significantly negative. This complies with the theoretical idea that the borrowers' solvency should increase with growing economic performance and thus the bank's asset quality should improve in economic booms. The positive effect of economic freedom (ecfree) on the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets once more confirms our observations from previous regressions (1) -(3).
Finally, corresponding to implications of banking regulation theory, higher regulatory quality as measured by the interaction term supv = gove*regq enters the regression significantly negative at the one-percent level indicating that higher regulatory and supervisory quality is associated with sustainable bank lending.
Conclusion
This contribution investigates the impact of market concentration on financial stability using bank balance sheet data of commercial banks being classified as MFIs across the EU-25 for the period from 1997 to 2005 while controlling for macroeconomic, bank-specific, supervisory and institutional factors. As a major result, we find that increasing market concentration has a negative impact on banks' financial soundness as measured by the Z-score derived from DE NICOLÓ (2000) . These findings are robust even when further specifying our regression on banks' asset -22-quality measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets. Moreover, we additionally find statistical significant evidence of a positive effect of increasing market concentration on banks' ROAA and equity to total assets ratio. Since both variables are included within the Zscore's numerator we conclude that rising financial instability of larger European banks in our sample results from an increasing standard deviation of the ROAA used in the Z-score's denominator. Given that standard deviations of the ROAA represent an indicator of the banks' risk taking behavior, the negative impact of higher market concentration on financial stability occurs due to the fact that larger European commercial banks tend to engage in riskier investments than smaller banks.
This assumption generally corresponds with empirical findings provided by DE NICOLÓ ET AL.
(2004). However, there is one crucial difference with regard to the results presented in this paper. Finding a decrease in the ratio of equity to total assets for larger banks in higher concentrated markets, DE NICOLÓ ET AL. conclude that an increase in the banks' leverage (as measured by the decrease of equity to total assets) provides an incentive for bank managers to take on risky investments. However, since we find a positive effect of higher market concentration on the banks' capital environment, we suggest that the increase in capital -serving as a "risk buffer"-and a higher level of banking freedom encourages (not forces) bank managers to take on higher risks.
Taking these empirical results into account and in regard to our research questions from Section 2 we suggest that the aspect of financial stability has to be established as another important evaluation criterion within the new European Directive on the approval process of cross-border bank mergers. We emphasize that a single-assessment of the financial soundness of the bidding bank pre-merger cannot be an adequate regulatory strategy if systemic risk (market concentration) increases with the bank size after a merger. However, though the Z-score might be an appropriate technique to measure the banks' financial soundness, it does not reveal transmission channels of systemic contagion. Hence, further research is necessary to evaluate mechanisms and channels as the interbank market or payment systems that are believed to spur systemic contagion across national borders. Moreover, responsibility for supervision and prudent regulation is still indistinct for pan-European banks that will emerge from cross-border bank mergers.
Our empirical analysis suggests that higher market concentration in Europe has a negative impact on financial stability but simultaneously stimulates banks' profitability. Thus, since banking market concentration may simultaneously affect financial stability as well as market effi-thorities should be further determined and be transparent for banks. According to our empirical results competition policy and banking regulation in Europe should not be in conflict since policies to foster competition in banking should also prevent the threat of banking system instability and vice versa. However, as European banks have voiced criticism on missing transparency concerning the merger approval process it seems to be important to establish further standards on the interaction between antitrust and supervisory authorities. 
-
Higher quality of regulatory environment and rule of law should support the enforceability of outstanding debts which may lead to a decrease of capital serving as a "buffer" against losses from non-performing loans 
